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CRIMINOLOGY
PLEA BARGAINING: ITS EFFECT ON SENTENCING AND CONVICTIONS IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA*
WILLIAM M. RHODES*
Citizens and public officials frequently share a
belief that the criminal courts face a crisis. Plea
bargaining-the process by which the state grants
sentencing and other concessions in exchange for
guilty pleas in criminal cases-is frequently para-
mount in this concern for crime control and justice.
Yet despite the general recognition of the impor-
tance of plea bargaining to American jurispru-
dence, disagreement persists about what plea bar-
gaining should accomplish given prevailing norms
of justice, what plea bargaining actually does ac-
complish given the reality of the judicial process,
and how the existing practice could be modified
(or preserved) through public policy.
Research reported in this study addresses these
concerns by posing and answering a broad ques-
tion: Who gains and who loses from plea bargain-
ing? Based on data contained in the Prosecutor's
Management Information System (PROMIS)
maintained by the United States Attorney's Office
in Washington, D.C., the analysis is essentially
empirical, and the attempt to quantify observa-
tions and support conclusions statistically contrasts
with an equally important existing body of re-
search, which is more qualitative.
A MODEL OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
The impact of plea bargaining on the criminal
justice system goes beyond the influence that ne-
gotiated settlements have on sentencing. To model
this impact, it is useful to draw an analogy between
the processing of criminal cases and the flow of
fluid through a network of pipes. The flow through
any branch of this network depends on the input
into the system, the capacity of the pipes, and the
* Portions of the research data contained in this article
were published in W. Rhodes, Plea Bargaining: Who
Gains? Who Loses?, PROMIS Research Publication No.
14 (INSLAW 1978).
** Senior Economist, Institute for Law and Social
Research.
setting of valves intended to regulate the flow.
Likewise, the processing of cases in a criminal court
is constrained by the number of arrests that occur,
by the quality of tangible evidence and witness
testimony associated with those arrests, by the
capacity of the different "branches" of the justice
system to handle cases, and by official policy or
informal rules. Compared with guilty pleas, trials
are expensive both in terms of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary organizational resources.' Because courts
have a limited trial capacity, trials cause pressure
to be applied to other parts of the criminal justice
system. As a reiult, court delay and other organi-
zational frictions may build, but these cannot in-
crease forever. The state's response to its limited
trial capacity is either to reject or dismiss a large
number of criminal cases or to dispose of a signifi-
cant volume of cases by guilty pleas.
I Resource limitations are social and political as well
as economic. Beyond manpower and facility constraints,
courtroom organizations have a limited capacity for con-
flict, and like all resources, stable work groups can tolerate
only a limited amount of strain. Eisenstein and Jacob
summarize this perspective well:
Pervasive conflict is not only unpleasant; it also
makes work more difficult. Cohesion produces a
sense of belonging and identification that satisfies
human needs. It is maintained in several ways.
Courtroom workgroups shun outsiders because of
their potential threat to group cohesion. The work-
group possesses a variety of adaptive techniques to
minimize the effect of abrasive participants. For
instance, the occasional defense attorney who vio-
lates routine cooperative norms may be punished
by having to wait until the end of the day to argue
his motion; he may be given less time than he wishes
for a lunch break in the middle of a trial; he may
be kept beyond usual court hours for bench confer-
ences. Likewise, unusually adversarial defense or
prosecuting attorneys are likely to smooth over their
formal conflicts with informal cordiality.
The instrumental expression of internal goals is
reducing or controlling uncertainty. The strong in-
centive to reduce uncertainty forces courtroom
members to work together, despite their different
orientations toward doing justice.
J. EISENsTEIN & H. JAcOB, FELONY JUSTICE 24 (1977).
PLEA BARGAINING
The prosecutor is frequently in the most strategic
position to regulate the flow of cases. He recognizes
that each method of case disposition (trial, pleas,
dismissals and rejections) consumes a portion of the
system's resources. In consuming the system's re-
sources, each method produces in the aggregaie
different results. An efficient prosecutor will ma-
nipulate each method to achieve the results that
he finds optimal.
When establishing his policy, the prosecutor will
balance competing considerations. These consid-
erations are: (1) Guilty pleas increase the number
of convictions. First, convictions increase since
guilty pleas are substitutes for trials and defendants
are sometimes acquitted at trial. Second, convic-
tions increase to the extent that guilty pleas reduce
dismissals. (2) Defendants receive more lenient sen-
tences where plea bargaining is used more exten-
sively. This follows if defendants are awarded sen-
tence or other concessions to induce them to plead
guilty. (3) Because of the above two considerations,
there is a trade-off between the number of convic-
tions and the sentences received by persons con-
victed of criminal offenses.
An efficient prosecutor's office operates at some
point on the production possibility frontier repre-
sented in Figure 1.2 Of course, the choice of where
to locate on this frontier need not be conscious and,
in fact, may be more likely to result from organi-
zational dynamics and interplay than policy
choice, although prosecutors do exercise some ad-
ministrative control over these matters? Of course,
2 J. JACOBY, THE PROSECtrrORS CHARGING DECISION
(1977); WESSEL, Plea Bargaining Analysis, 13 THE PROSE-
CUTOR 283 (1978).
3The choice of a position on the frontier has public
policy implications, but before sketching some of these, it
is appropriate to enhance the model's realism in three
ways.
In the model's present form, it is assumed that all
arrests are suitable for prosecution and that resource
constraints alone result in dismissals. In reality, many
arrests which do not merit prosecution are dismissed. See
F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A
SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1970); K. Williams, The Role of
the Victim in the Prosecution of Violent Crimes in 24
(INSLAW 1978). The model is adaptable to this even-
tuality by limiting prosecutions to those cases which merit
adjudication. The adaptability of the model assumes that
a standard independent of resource constraints (e.g., a
legally defined standard) is used for screening.
The model also assumes that all cases would be pros-.
ecuted irrespective of the quality of tangible evidence
and the availability of witnesses. That is, it is assumed
that weaker cases are dropped because resource con-
straints, force the prosecutor's priority to be placed on
stronger cases, but all cases would be prosecuted if there
it is possible for an inefficient -attorney's office to
operate within the frontier, a possibility 'not ad-
dressed here.
It is not possible to state generally where on this
production possibility frontier a policy-conscious
prosecutor will choose to operate his office.4 How-
were sufficient resources. In reality, the level of evidence
may be so deficient in 'some cases that prosecution would
be inappropriate even if the system had the capacity to
hear such cases. See B. Forst, J. Lucianovic & S. Cox,
What Happens After Arrest? A*Court Perspective of
Police Operations in the District of Columbia, PROMIS
Research Report No.'4 (INSLAW 1977). Again, the
model can be adapted by assuming that such cases are
dropped from processing.
Finally, the model fosters the impression that plea
bargaining arises only because of ihe cost and uncertainty
of trials. This is not necessarily true. Many guilty pleas
resemble hn amitable settlement of a civil case. See A.
RossE-r'& D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE aY CONSENT (1976). When
neither side conteits the material facts of a criminal case
they may view the trial as unnecessary because the trial
outcome can be easily approximated, or even inproved
upon, by a negotiated settlement.
Such "settlements" are likely to occur frequently. In
cases such as simple assault or petit larceny, a finding of
the defendant's guilt may be likely ind conviction at trial
often would result in probation. Given the expense of a
trial, little may be gained by dither the state or the
defendant in contesting the charge.
However, nct all criminal cases are likely to have
amicable dispositions. In many cases, there is ample room
for bargaining, and it may be necessary for the state to
offer a concession in order to induce guilty pleas. See D.
NEWMAN, CoNvI crioN (1966); D. NEUBAUER, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERICA (1974). See also LaGoy, Senna
& Siegel, An Empirical Study of Information Usage for Prose-
cutorial Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 435 (1976); Mather, Some Determinants of the
Method of Case Disposition: Decision-Making by Public De-
fnders in Los Angeles, 8 LAW & Soc. REv. 187 (1973).
Bargaining is more likely when there is Uncertainty about
conviction at trial and/or when the sentence following
conviction is expected to be severe. Se MODELING TilE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 145 (S. Nagel ed. 1977); Adel-
stein, The Plea Bargain in Theory: A Behavioral Model of the
Negotiated Guilj Plea, 44 S. EcON. J. 408 (1978). Se also D.
Weimer, Plea Bargaining and the Decision To Go To
Trial (April 1977) (Working paper #74, Graduate School
of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley); E.
Noam, The Criminal Justice System-An Economic
Analysis of Benefits and Interrelations (1975) (unpub-
lished Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University), J. Lach-
man, An Economic Model Qf Plea Bargaining in the
Criminal Justice System (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Michigan State University). Because of these
contested cases, the model's conclusion, that convictions
will be exchanged for reduced sentences remains perti-
nent; in individual cases, such inducements need. not be
observed.
' Our inability to make such a general statement stems
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FIGURE 1
Relationship between convictions and sentences
ever, it is possible to examine where on the frontier
one prosecutor-the United States attorney for the
District of Columbia-operated his office in 1974.
While conclusions based on this examination are
applicable only to the District of Columbia, a
recent study of a number of jurisdictions with the
Prosecutor's Management Information System
(PROMIS) revealed that case processing in the
District of Columbia is typical of case processing
in other settings.5
THE PROCESsING OF CASES IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
Data came from 1974 arrests processed in the
Superior Court of Washington, D.C. To ensure a
sufficient number of cases to make statistical anal-
ysis meaningful, the examination includes four
role perceptions. They are also likely to differ in their
perceptions of how office policy affects crime control.
Finally, they are likely to exercise varying amounts of
control over the way that assistant prosecutors actually
handle criminal matters.
5 K. Brosi, A Cross-City Comparison of Felony Case
Processing (INSLAW 1979). In the District, prosecutors
reject somewhat more felony cases than their counter-
parts in Cobb County (Ga.), Milwaukee, and Salt Lake,
but they reject considerably fewer than prosecutors in
New Orleans and Los Angeles. The rate at which filed
felony cases go to trial in the District is greater than in
about half the PROMIS sites studied (Cobb County,
Rhode Island, Golden (Colo.), Milwaukee, and Kala-
mazoo) but less than in the others (Los Angeles, Florida
Second Circuit, Detroit, Louisville, Indianapolis, and
New Orleans). However, unlike other sites, in the District
a trial is almost always by jury. The percentage of
convictions that are guilty pleas is comparable across the
sites examined. Finally, court delay from arrest to post-
indictment disposition (about 224 days) was greater than
in New Orleans, Los Angeles, and Indianapolis, but less
than in Detroit, Cobb County, and Rhode Island.
high-volume charges: assault, burglary, larceny,
and robbery. "Charge" was based on the most
serious accusation brought by the arresting officer,
even though the defendant may have been prose-
cuted for a different offense. The charge which the
police officer brought appears to be the best avail-
able substitute, for the offense that the accused is
said to have committed. Its use allows a comparison
between cases actually prosecuted and those which
were not. Because the police may have an incentive
to overcharge at this stage, the statistical analysis
regarding the charge description controls for the
amount of harm to victims and the property loss.
Other substitutes for the offense committed were
problematic. According to experienced prosecutors,
a less serious felony charge is frequently filed by
the screening prosecutor with the expectation that
the grand jury will include more serious charges in
the indictment, and the final conviction may reflect
charge reduction following plea bargaining. There-
fore, we concluded that neither the charge initially
filed nor the conviction was appropriate for this
study.
The processing of these four high-volume of-
fenses is outlined in Figure 2. Only three-fourths of
the cases survived the initial screening. Of the
surviving cases, less than half were prosecuted;
others were dismissed by the prosecutor or by the
court. Ultimately, twenty-nine percent of the as-
sault cases, thirty-six percent of the burglary cases,
thirty-three percent of the larceny cases, and thirty-
eight percent of the robbery cases either went to
trial or were terminated by a guilty plea. Of the
cases that were prosecuted, guilty pleas predomi-
nate. Just over one in three assault prosecutions
resulted in a trial. Fewer than one of three individ-
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B. ROBBERY
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78 total
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to trial. Thus, as expected, out-of-court settlements ceiving a jail or prison sentence varied by offense.
dominated the processing of cases in the District of Approximately one-third of the assault and larceny
Columbia courts. defendants received prison sentences following con-




for those individuals convicted of burglary and to
more than two-thirds for persons convicted of rob-
bery.
Sentences were categorized as probation, incar-
ceration under the Federal Youth Corrections Act
or Narcotics Rehabilitation Act, incarceration for
a minimum period less than three years, and in-
carceration for a minimum period of three years or
more. Probation authorities usually release persons
following a minimum sentence; thus, the minimum
sentence imposed corresponds closely to the sen-
tence actually served.6
In the following two sections this article will
compare the sentences received by defendants con-
victed at trial with the sentences received by those
entering guilty pleas. The final two sections will
assess the probability that defendants who entered
guilty pleas would have been convicted if they had
gone to trial.
SENTENCING IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS
Some of the factors which influence the sentence
received by defendants convicted at trial are diffi-
cult to quantify (e.g., a defendant's demeanor),
while others are sometimes incompletely or inac-
curately reported in the data base (e.g., employ-
ment status). Despite these limitations, there re-
main patterns of variables that are correlated with
sentence severity, and those factors are used here
to explain sentencing in the criminal courts.
These patterns were reduced to three sets. First,
some researchers have found that a defendant's
personal characteristics affect his sentence. Thus,
age, sex, and release on own recognizance (the
latter as a measure of established community ties)
were included in the analysis. Second, specific at-
tributes of the offense were considered as a set of
potential factors influencing the sentence imposed.
The amount of damage to property and the
amount of injury to persons were assessed; as were
the presence of a gun at the time of arrest and the
number of charges included in the indictment.
Third, the defendant's arrest record was believed
to be a determinant of the sentence imposed. Thus,
the number of previous arrests for crimes against
property and the number of previous arrests for
crimes against the person were included in the
analysis.
The PROBIT results reported in Table 2 were
'T. Dungworth, An Empirical Assessment of Sentenc-
ing Practices in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, PROMIS Research Publication No. 17 (IN-
SLAW 1978).
derived from parsimonious specifications. 7 A one-
tailed test of statistical significance was used, and
statistical significance was determined at .05 and
.10 levels of confidence. The statistic x2 equals
minus two times the log likelihood ratio, where the
latter was determined by comparing the likelihood
of the fully specified model with the likelihood of
the model with the fl's constrained to equal zero.
The summary statistic, R2 , is the square of the
multiple correlation coefficient and has an inter-
pretation analogous to that of its counterpart in
ordinary least squares regression. In addition,
Table 2 presefits the proportion of cases predicted
correctly and the expected value of the proportion
that would be predicted by chance.
8
Generally, our findings conformed to our expec-
tations and were consistent with the findings re-
ported by other researchers in different settings.9
Because the dependent variable of sentence severity
was measured on an ordinal scale, a form of PROBIT
was used to estimate the probability of receiving a given
sentence. See McKelvey & Zavoina, A Statistical Model for
the Analysis of Ordinal Level Dependent Variables, 4 J. MATH.
Soc. 103 (1975). "
In general, the model's specification is:
Pr[Y, 1 _ i A ,-- X
-,[At.-, - 180 - 2iXu]
where 4 represents the cumulative standard normal den-
sity function. The ju and fl's are parameters estimated
using maximum likelihood techniques. Pr [Yo- = 11 is the
probability that the ith observation of the dependent
variable falls into the kth category of the dependent
variable y. Descriptions of the independent variables, Xii,
can be found in Table 1. Data used in the analysis
include all defendants who were convicted at trial.
There are several ways to -guess" at the sentence.
The method chosen here is analogous to that used to
calculate lambda, a measure of association commonly
used in contingency table analysis. The technique re-
quires one to assign defendants randomly to each of the
sentencing categories so that the final number of defend-
ants placed in each category equals the number actually
observed in that category. Probability theory is used to
calculate the expected number of mistakes that would
arise through such a process.
9 See Chiricos & Waldo, Socioeconomic Status and Criminal
Sentencing: An Empirical Assessment of a Conflict Proposition,
40 AM. Soc. REv. 753 (1977); Hagan, Criminal Justice in
Rural and Urban Communities: A Study of the Bureaucratization
ofJustice, 55 Soc. Fotcms 597 (1977); Jacob & Eisenstein,
Sentencing and Other Sanctions in the Criminal Courts of Balti-
more, Chicago and Detroit, 90 Pot.. Sc. Q. 617 (1975);
Tiffany, Avichai & Peters, A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing
in Federal Courts: Defendants Convicted After Trial, 1967-1968,
4 J. LEc. SruDIES 369 (1975); Burke & Turk, Factors
Affecting Post-arrest Dispositions: A Model for Analysis, 22




VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSION EQUATIONS ON SENTENCING FOLLOWING CONVICTION AT TRIAL IN SUPERIOR COURT
yi, equals one if the ith defendant was sentenced to probation.
Yi2 equals one if the i'h defendant was sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (receiving a sentence other
than probation) or if the defendant was sentenced under the Narcotics Rehabilitation Act.
yis equals one if the ith defendant was sentenced to incarceration with a minimum term of less than three years.
Y14 equals one if the ith defendant was sentenced to incarceration with a minimum term of three years or more.
xnI equals one if the ith defendant was released on personal recognizance prior to trial (ROR).
xi2 equals one if the defendant was a male (SEX).
Xia equals the defendant's age in years (AGE).
x14 equals one if a gun was present at the time of arrest (GUN).
x6 harm to the victim; coded zero for none or threat only, coded one if there were minor injuries, coded two if
victims were treated and released, coded three if victims were hospitalized. The most serious harm done
determined the category coded (HARM).
xi6 dollar value of property stolen, damaged, or destroyed; coded zero for none, coded one for under $10, coded two
for between $10 and $200, coded three for between $250 and $2,000, and coded four if in excess of $2,000
(DOLLAR VALUE).
X17 number of previous arrests for crimes against persons (CRIMES AG PERS).
xi number of previous arrests for crimes against property (CRIMES AG PROP).
X19 number of charges ever brought (CHARGES).
Although corresponding results reported in an ear-
lier study on sentencing practices were based on a
different model and used similar but not identical
data, the findings for this study are in substantive
agreement with those reported in the sentencing
study.5
0
Overall, we found that males generally received
more severe sanctions than females and that indi-
viduals who were released on personal recognizance
(ROR) prior to trial were sentenced more leniently.
This latter finding is consistent with the belief that
ROR defendants have more community ties than
non-ROR defendants and, as a result, make better
probation risks." While the age of the defendant
did not have an impact on sentence severity, the
seriousness of the harm done to the victim was an
important factor in explaining sentences following
convictions for assault and for burglary, but not
for robbery. 12 The value of property lost was im-
portant for robbery, larceny, and burglary-and,
Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint,
8 LAW & Soc. REV. 357 (1974); Green, Inter- and Intra-
racial Crime Relative to Sentencing, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
348 (1964).
10 T. Dungworth, note "6 supra.
1 In a study of pretrial release practices in the District
of Columbia, over 40% of the felony defendants were
released on personal recognizance; previous record, num-
ber of cases pending, and employment were important
variables in predicting release. But there is considerable
doubt about how strongly these variables are correlated
with pretrial misconduct and, thus, whether ROR clients
actually make better probation risks. See Roth & Wice,
Pretrial Release and Misconduct in the District of Colum-
bia, PROMIS Research Publication No. 16 (INSLAW
1979).
12 The reason robbery deviates from the statistical
to a degree, for assault, while possession of a gun
increased the sentence in assault and burglary
cases. Previous arrests generally increased the prob-
ability that a defendant would be sentenced to
prison rather than to probation. Finally, sentence
leniency was inversely related to the number of
counts in the indictment for robbery and'burglary.
This model significantly improved our ability to
explain the sentence received following conviction
at trial. Using these results, we can accurately
predict the sentence received in assault cases sev-
enty-six percent of the time, in robbery cases forty-
six percent of the time, in larceny cases sixty-nine
percent of the time, and in burglary cases fifty-six
percent of the time.13 In contrast, if we were to
guess at the sentences received, the percentage of
times that we would expect to be correct ranges
from a high of sixty-four percent for aissault to a
low of twenty-seven percent for robbery."'
norm is not absolutely clear. Yet, perhaps robbery is such
a serious offense that the factor that an individual is
harmed during a robbery may have little independent
effect on the ultimate sentence received. However, if the
robbery victim incurs a serious injury during the course of
a robbery, a more serious charge is likely to be lodged.
13 If we accept a strict regression analogue and calcu-
late adjusted R2, then explanatory power falls from .23
to .16 (assault), .38 to .34 (robbery), .28 to .25 (larceny),
and .30 to .25 (burglary). See F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHA-
ZUR, MULTIPLE REGRESSIOJ IN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 282-
83 (1973).
14 Knowing that given percentages of defendants
charged with each offense will receive jail terms, proba-
tion, and acquittals, our "guess" was based on a random
assignment of all defendants in each data base to prison,
probation, or freedom. We then compared the actual
outcome of each defendant's encounter with the criminal
TABLE 2
REGRESSION RESULTS ON SENTENCING OFFENDERS CONVICTED AT TRIAL
Regression coefficients and asymptotic z scores
Explanatory Variables
Assault Robbery Larceny Burglary
Constant -1.79** -1.28** -1.85** -0.20
(2.74) (1.90) (3.1) (.43)
ROR -0.42* "-0.48** -0.55** -0.33*
(1.42) (2.19) (2.66) (1.37)
SEX 0.25 0.46 1.14**
(.55) (.99) (2.30)
AGE 0.03 0.04"* -0.01 -0.02
(.21) (1.83) (.36) (.97)
GUN 0.47* .18 0.57*
(1.47) (.83) (1.49)
HARM .20* -. 12 *** 0.29*
(1.51) (.76) (1.69)
DOLLAR VALUE 0.30* 0.23** 0.30** 0.15**
(1.32) (2.49) (2.71) (1.66)
CRIMES AG. PERS 0.11* 0.07** 0.04* -0.07
(1.56) (1.99) (1.37) (1.24)
CRIMES AG. PROP 0.03 0.04* 0.02 0.06**
(.75) (1.31) (.87) (2.28)
CHARGES 0.09 0.1 1** 0.08 0.09**
(1.22) '(3.44) (1.12) (1.97)
15.87* 52.86** 30.08** 33.46**
R .23 .38 .28 .30
% Predicted Correct 76% 46% 69% 56%
% Correct by Chance 64% 27% 54% 33%
N of cases 113 157 185 123
Notes:
* Significant at p < .10
•* Significant at p < .05
•** Gun and harm were infrequently elements of the offense (larceny); virtually all burglars were male
Results from the regression analyses lend cre-
dence to the belief that the model can predict
sentences received following trial. Of course, the
main purpose of this exercise was not to predict the
sentences of defendants convicted at trial. Rather,
our primary interest was to predict the sentence
that would have been received by defendants ac-
tually entering a guilty plea or actually having
their cases terminated in a dismissal, if they had in
fact been convicted at trial. These predictions are
reported and discussed below.
PREDICTED SENTENCES FOR DEFENDANTS CONVICTED
BY PLEA OR DISMISSED
In this section, we will compare the sentences
received by defendants who entered guilty pleas
with the sentences received by individuals con-
justice system with our randomly predicted result. The
percentage of the time our random assignment correctly
predicted the actual result constituted the percentage of
times we would expect to be correct.
victed at trial. The sentence received following trial
was also compared with a predicted sentence: a
sentence which we predict would have been im-
posed had the defendant who pled guilty actually
gone to trial. The prediction is based on the regres-
sion model reported in the previous section.
In .he first column of Table 3 sentences are
grouped into four categories of increasing severity:
probation, incarceration under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act (FYCA) or the Narcotics Rehabil-
itation Act (NARA), a minimum sentence of less
than three years, and a minimum sentence of three
years or more.
The second column records the proportion of
offenders convicted at trial who actually received
a given type of sentence. Column 3(a) records a
comparable measure for defendants convicted by
plea. Column 3(b) presents the sentence distribu-
tion that would be expected if the same guilty plea
defendants had been convicted at trial, and the
fourth column shows the corresponding expecta-
tion for persons whose cases were dismissed either
WILLIAM M, RHODES [Vol. 70
PLEA BARGAINING
TABLE 3
OBSERVED AND PREDICTED SENTENCES FOLLOWINC CONVICTION AT TRIAL, GUILTY PLEA, AND NOLLE PROSEQUI:
PROPORTION OF INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED TO EACH OF FOUR SENTENCES
Sentence Imposed
Charge and Following Number of
Sentence Following Conviction Following Trials to
Severity Conviction CoiPleanNolle Guilty Pleas
(1) at Trial by Plea Pmscequi (5)
actual (2) act. (3a) exp. (3b) Xp. (4)
Assault 113/280
Probation 78% 80% 77% 77%
FYCA/NARA'
Minimum < 3 yrs. 18 18 20 18
Minimum > 3 yrs. 4 2 2 5
Robbery 157/435
Probation 25 43 24 30
FYCA/NARA 19 21 21 24
Minimum < 3 yrs. 21 23 22 22
Minimum > 3 yrs. 35 14 32 25
Larceny 185/745
Probation 69 70 67 75
FYCA/NARA 6 4 7 6
Minimum < 3 yrs. 25 26 27 19
Minimum > 3 yrs.'
Burglary 123/554
Probation 50 53 51 61
FYCA/NARA 14 15 14 14
Minimum 3 yrs. 24 27 23 19
Minimum 3 yrs. 12 5 11 6
Category merged with "minimum < 3 yrs."
by the prosecutor or by the judge. Columns 3(b)
and 4 were predicted from the regression equations.
Comparing colurins 2 and 3(a) with column
3(b) leads to two conclusions. First, with respect to
assault, larceny, and burglary, defendants who en-
tered guilty pleas received sentences comparable to
sentences they would have received had they been
convicted at trial. For assault, seventy-seven per-
cent of the defendants were expected to receive
probation; eighty percent actually received pro-
bation. For larceny, sixty-seven percent were pre-
dicted to be placed on probation; seventy percent
actually were. For burglary, we expected fifty-one
percent of the defendants to receive probation;
fifty-three percent did. Based on these data, we
conclude that prosecutors are not giving significant
plea bargaining concessions and that judges are
not rewarding guilty pleas with sentence leniency
for these three offenses.
In contrast, plea bargaining concessions were
apparent for robbery convictions. Using the regres-
sion equations, we predicted that twenty-four per-
cent of those defendants who entered a guilty plea
after being arrested for robbery would receive pro-
bation. In fact, forty-three percent received pro-
bation. We also predicted that thirty-two percent
of the robbery offenders would receive a prison
sentence with a minimum length of three years or
more. In fact, only fourteen percent received such
a severe sentence following a guilty plea. This may
indicate that considerable bargaining is occurring
for robbery cases and that, in general, a robbery
suspect can expect to fare better if he enters a
guilty plea instead of being convicted at trial. 5
Finally, we found that suspects whose cases were
dismissed would have received somewhat lighter,
but not radically different, sentences compared
with their convicted counterparts.
15 These findings are consistent with those reported in
T. Dungworth, note 6 supra. Dungworth reports marked
sentence concessions awarded to robbery suspects. His
findings with respect to other personal crimes are not
comparable, because he did not include misdemeanors in
his analysis. With respect to crimes against property (he
includes crimes against the public order in this category),
his findings were comparable to those reported here: 50X,
of the guilty plea convictions resulted in probation rela-
tive to 48% of the convictions at trial. T. Dungworth,
supra note 6, at V-35 and V-36.
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TABLE 4
VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS OF CONVICTION FOLLOWING TRIAL IN SUPERIOR COURT
Wit equals one if the i"h defendant was convicted at trial.
Wi2 equals one if the ith defendant was acquitted at trial.
xII the defendant's age in years (AGE).
xi2 coded one if the defendant was arrested the same day the offense was committed (SAME).
Xi3 coded one if physical evidence was available (PHYSE).
Xi4 the number of charges (CHARGES).
xi5 coded one if the defendant was arrested at the scene of the offense, although not necessarily at the same time as
the offense occurred (SCENE).
xis the number of lay witnesses (LAYWIT).
x17 coded one if the defendant was released on personal recognizance (ROR).
xi8 coded one if the defendant was granted a third-party release (SR).
xiS coded one if there was corroboration that a crime was committed (CORROB).
XiI0 coded one if exculpatory evidence was present (EXCULP).
Our failure to find significant plea bargaining
concessions, with the exception of robbery cases,
runs contrary to our expectations. As such, the
findings mandate explanation. However, this ex-
planation will be deferred. Next, the analysis turns
to predicting the probability of conviction at trial.
THE PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION AT TRIAL
In the previous two sections, PROBIT analysis
was used to estimate the probability of receiving
different types of sentences if convicted at trial.
These estimates then were used to predict the sen-
tence that would have been received by those
defendants actually pleading guilty if they had in
fact gone to trial. Here, the probability of being
convicted at trial is estimated using the availability
of physical evidence, the number of lay witnesses,
whether the defendant was arrested at the scene of
the offense, whether the defendant was arrested
within one day of the offense, the number of
charges, and the defendant's pretrial release status
as explanatory variables. PROBIT again was used
to estimate the probability of conviction.
1 6
We believed that release on personal recogni-
zance was more likely for weaker cases, that evi-
dence corroborating the fact that a crime had been
committed was likely to increase the probability of
conviction, while exculpatory evidence decreased
it, and that the number of charges increased the
The general form of the model was:
Pr [W it = 1] = (A -05° - Jxij]
Pr [Wa = 1] = l-Pr [Wil I]
where Pr [Wil = 1] is the probability of being convicted
at trial; 0 the cumulative standard normal density func-
tion. Variables entering the model are described in Table
probability of conviction. Therefore, a one-tailed
test of significance was used for these four variables
at. 10 and .05 levels of confidence. However, initial
analysis showed no definite patterns with respect
to the other variables.1
7
We found that while physical evidence and the
availability of witnesses appeared to increase the
likelihood of a robbery conviction, they appeared
to decrease the likelihood of a burglary conviction.
Similarly, the presence of evidence corroborating
the existence of an offense seemed to increase the
probability of conviction for all studied offenses
17 The social relationship between the victim and the
defendant, and whether there was provocation or partic-
ipation by the victim, had no significant impact on the
probability of conviction at trial. See K. Williams, note 3
supra. Alternative specifications were attempted and re-
jected because they failed to enhance explanatory power.
These alternative specifications included the above vari-
ables and the following ones:
1. The screening prosecutor's estimate of the prob-
ability of conviction. A question was posed to the
screening prosecutor, asking him the "probability of
winning" the case. Allowable responses were: "poor
(under 50%)," "fair (50%-75%)," "good (75%-
90%)," and "excellent (90%-100%)." In one speci-
fication, the category mean was used as an explan-
atory variable. In an alternative specification,
dummy categories were created for each response
category. In neither case were the results statistically
significant, and in some cases, the regression coeffi-
cients were in the wrong direction.
2. Availability of an eyewitness; availability of a
complaining witness. The number of lay witnesses
was refined to reflect whether eye witnesses and
complaining witnesses were available. If so, a
dummy variable was created for each category.
Results were not statistically significant.
3. The seriousness of the offense. The estimates from
the sentencing regression equations were used as
weights for the seriousness of the offense. This did





REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION FOR DEFENDANTS GOING TO TRIAL
Regression coefficients and a.yrnptotic z scores
Explanatory Variables
Assault Robbery Larceny Burglary
Constant .24 .60 -. 23 1.65**
(.57) (1.23) (.46) (2.72)
AGE -. 005 -. 04** -. 00 -. 01
(.61) (2.46) (.03) (1.17)
SAME -. 97** -. 05 .36 -. 45
(2.90) (.14) (1.27) (1.20)
PHYSE .05 .79** -. 34 -2*
(.22) (2.56) (1.18) (1.82)
CHARGES .22"* -. 02 .18** .07*
(2.94) (.39) (1.64) (1.43)
SCENE .78** .23 .32 -. 05
(2.61) (.78) (1.45) (.14)
LAYWIT -. 05 .38** -. 02 -.25*
(.60) (2.65) (.22) (2.20)
ROR -. 28* -. 57** .06 -.53**
(1.45) (2.00) (.35) (2.11)
SR .40 -. 50 -. 30 -. 16
(1.11) (1.32) (.91) (.52)
CORROB .26* .66** .27* .46**
(1.39) (2.51) (1.57) (1.93)
EXCULP .09 -. 36 -. 54 -1.23**
(.14) (.71) (1.11) (2.42)
27.2** 31.6* 14.1 25.8"*
.21 .37 .10 .26
% Predicted Correct 68% 79% 70% 67%
% Correct by Chance 54% 65% 56% 55%
N of cases 234 174 268 169
Notes:
* Significant at .10
** Significant at .05
except burglary. For burglary, the existence of
exculpatory evidence seemed to reduce the proba-
bility of conviction.' 8 Being arrested within one
day of the offense, the number of charges brought,
and being arrested at the scene of the offense all
appeared to raise the likelihood of conviction only
in assault. Finally, we found that being released on
I Note that the probability of convicting accused bur-
glars decreased with both the availability of physical evi-
dence and with the number of lay witnesses (in contrast
td robbery convictions). It seems that either' (a) the
variables are proxies for other elements of the offense or
(b) the evidence may be used by the defense as well as
the prosecutor. As an illustration, the availability of a lay
witness in a burglary offense may indicate a more "triv-
ial" offense, such as that of a friend stealing from a friend.
On the other hand, the lack of a lay witness may more
typically indicate a nighttime burglary of a warehouse,
for example, in which there were no witnesses. At any
rate, the fact that these variables appear to have the
"wrong" sign is not too troublesome here since we are
primarily interested in prediction rather than estimation.
recognizance was significant only in burglary and
robbery cases.
Unfortunately, the regressions did not function
as well for this data as it did for the previous
regressions on sentences. Nevertheless, using the
multivariate results to predict the probability of
conviction increased the proportion of correct pre-
dictions, relative to chance, from fifty-four percent
to sixty-eight percent for assault, from sixty-five
percent to seventy-nine percent for robbery, from
fifty-six percent to seventy percent for larceny, and
from fifty-five percent to sixty-seven percent for
burglary.
These findings have interesting implications.
Once cases have been accepted for prosecution, it
is difficult to predict whether they will lead to a
conviction at trial. Perhaps this can be attributed
to the vagaries of judges and juries; perhaps the
quality of evidence, especially witness testimony,
cannot be accurately assessed until the time of the
19791
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trial; or perhaps the variables, or their measure-
ment, used in this analysis fail to capture what is
important in convincing ajudge or ajury of guilt.19
ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF CONVICTION AT
TRIAL: CASES TERMINATED BY GUILTY PLEA OR
DISMISSAL
The previous section examined the probability
of conviction for defendants who went to trial. In
this section, those estimates are used to predict the
probability of conviction at a hypothetical trial (a)
for defendants actually entering guilty pleas and
(b) for defendants whose cases actually were dis-
missed.
Table 6 consists of four rows pertaining to the
four offenses examined. The first two columns per-
tain to cases terminated at trial. The next column
corresponds to cases terminated by a guilty plea.
The final column pertains to cases ending with a
dismissal. The column labeled "A" reports the
observed proportion of convictions at trial for each
type of offense. Columns labeled "B" report the
estimated proportion of convictions at hypothetical
trials based on the multivariate results.
For present purposes, the most interesting find-
ings appear in the columns "By Plea" and "Dis-
missed." The plea column indicates that if defend-
ants went to trial rather than entering guilty pleas,
they would be convicted at about the same rate as
those actually going to trial. To illustrate, we pre-
dicted that sixty-six percent of the defendants who
plead guilty in assault cases would be convicted if
tried; the actual conviction rate for assault cases
was sixty-five percent. For robbery, we predicted
eighty-four percent of the guilty plea cases would
have resulted in convictions at trial; seventy-eight
"9 We know of only one other study that has attempted
to predict the probability of conviction at trial using the
availability of evidence and witnesses as explanatory
variables. That study is J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, note
I supra. Unfortunately, Eisenstein and Jacob exclude
some variables included in our analysis; they include
other variables that are not included in the present study;
and since they do not report the specification of their
regressions or detail their findings, it is difficult to make
a direct comparison. Nevertheless, it is notable that they,
too, were unable to account for much of the "variance"
in their data and attributed very little of their explana-
tory power to "strength of the evidence." J. EISENSTEIN
& H. JACOB, supra note 1, at 242. They are careful to
point out, however, that this failure may be attributable
to measurement errors in the variables representing
"strength of the evidence." J. EISENSTEIN & H. JAcoa,
supra note 1, at 183. It appears that the amount and
quality of evidence are reported in greater detail, and
with more accuracy, in PROMIS.
TABLE 6
PROPORTIONS OF CONVICTIONS: ACTUAL AND PREDICTED
At Trial By Plea Nolle
Charge
A B B B
Assault 65% 66% 66% 59%
Robbery 78 79 84 78
Larceny 66 68 69 67
Burglary 67 67 68 64
Code:
A Observed probability of conviction at trial = num-
ber of convictions/total number of trials
B Predicted probability of conviction had this case
gone to trial, based on the regression equations
reported in Table 5.





percent of litigated robbery cases resulted in con-
victions. For larceny and burglary we predicted
convictions in sixty-nine and sixty-eight percent of
the guilty plea cases, respectively; in sixty-six per-
cent of the larceny cases and in sixty-seven percent
of the burglary cases that went to trial convictions
were forthcoming. Thus, were it not for the significant
number of guilty pleas, a large number of criminal cases
probably would not result in conviction because trial out-
comes are uncertain. If all guilty plea cases went to
trial, the percentage of prosecutions leading to
conviction would fall from eighty-seven percent to
sixty-six percent (assault), ninety-three percent to
eighty-two percent (robbery), ninety-one percent
to sixty-eight percent (larceny), and ninety-two
percent to sixty-eight percent (burglary).20 Addi-
tionally, a larger number of trials would be ex-
pected to reduce the rate of prosecutions, further
limiting the number of convictions.
These findings have two implications. First, cou-
pled with the finding that sentencing concessions
in exchange for guilty pleas are not pervasive (with
the exception of robbery), more defendants should
go to trial. It would appear to be in their interest
to do so since they are likely to receive an equiv-
" Given the present mix of guilty pleas (G) and trials
(T), the observed proportion of cases going to trial that
result in conviction (P,) and the estimated proportion of
guilty plea cases that would result in conviction if tried
(Pgp), the conviction rate equals ir x Pt) + GI/[T +
GI. If all defendants who presently plead guilty actually
went to trial, the conviction rate would fall to [(r x Pt)
+ (G X Pg,)]/[T + G1.
21 For the many defendants having appointed counsel,
the cost of presenting a defense is unlikely to deter them




DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN BY THE PROSECUTING ATrORNEY OF GUILTY PLEA DISPOSITIONS
Type of Offense
Avsault Robbery Larceny Burglary
As Charged by Prosecutor 80% 56% 90% 63%
To Lesser Offense 11 26 5 18
Nolle/Other Cases 1 0 1 0
Nolle/This Caseb  6 16 4 19
Alford 2 3 0 0
Source: PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management Information System).
Note: Number of cases examined: assault (432), robbery (463), larceny (797), and burglary (597).
* Defendant pled guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to dismiss a second pending case.
b Defendant pled guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to dismiss one or more counts of the present
indictment.
alent sanction if convicted, whereas they stand a
good chance of being acquitted at trial. Second,
this evidence seems to contradict an often-made
assertion that cases in which guilt is contested will
go to trial. If the evidence stored in PROMIS can
be taken as an indicator, guilty plea convictions
frequently may result in conviction of the legally
innocent, i.e., persons who would not be adjudged
guilty at trial.
Interesting implications are not limited to hy-
pothetical trial outcomes for defendants entering
guilty pleas. Note that the last two columns of
Table 6 lead to the conclusion that dismissed cases
frequently would result in conviction if taken to
trial.
The analysis next investigates the reasons behind
plea bargains and the reasons for dismissals. This
information helps explain the pattern of disposi-
tions observed in the previous section.
EXPLANATIONS OF PLEA AND DISMISSAL
DISPOSITIONS
Table 7 reports the frequency with which the
prosecutors cite a series of standard descriptions of
guilty pleas. Note that assault and larceny cases
are frequently pled "as charged." Indeed, even if
dismissals in exchange for pleas of guilty to other
charges in the same case and dismissals in exchange
for guilty pleas in other cases are considered to
reflect charge reductions, then eighty percent of
the assault pleas and ninety percent of the larceny
pleas are to the most serious charge.22 Since charge
22 This is likely to be explained in part by the fact that
there may be fewer appropriate "lesser included offenses"
for assault and larceny, so these findings reflect statutory
rather than behavioral explanations. Our main interest
is to work with sentence concessions, and the only purpose
reduction is the primary method of plea bargaining
in the District of Columbia, it is not surprising to
discover that sentence concessions infrequently re-
sult for assault and larceny cases.
Robbery suspects enter guilty pleas to the most
serious charge only fifty-six percent of the time, a
frequency that corresponds to the high rate- of
sentence concessions awarded to persons who pled
guilty following an arrest for robbery. However,
individuals charged with burglary pled guilty to
the most serious charge sixty-three percent of the
time yet no sentencing concessions were apparent.
Thus, sentencing patterns are consistent with dis-
positions for assault, robbery, and larceny, but
burglary appears as an anomaly.
Having found that a guilty plea does not neces-
sarily result in a charge reduction; and that a
charge reduction does not necessarily lead to a
sentence concession, the question remains: Why do
defendants enter guilty pleas in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia? Defendants who plead
guilty following an arrest for robbery receive sen-
tence concessions. This would seem to explain, in
part, their motivations to forego a trial. However,
defendants accused of assault, larceny, and bur-
glary are about as likely as robbery defendants to
enter guilty pleas, although the latter offenses in-
frequently result in sentence reductions. Clearly,
explanations must be sought beyond the incentive
to seek leniency in exchange for "consideration."
Unfortunately, direct evidence supportive of
other explanations is unavailable. It is possible that
attorneys and judges are simply unaware of the
actual outcomes of guilty pleas, and act as though
in including these statistics here is to record the extent to
which a charge reduction is used, by the prosecutor, to
communicate a desire for sentence leniency.
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pleas routinely result in-sentence concessions. When
these findings were shown to local prosecutors and
judges, they generally expressed surprise. The pre-
vailing belief among court participants seems to be
that sentence concessions do follow guilty pleas.
Nonetheless, lack of knowledge of existing sen-
tencing patterns does not explain the patterns de-
tected. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that in
many cases a prison or jail sentence is unlikely to
occur no matter how a defendant is convicted.
Even when convicted by a jury, almost four of
every five defendants accused of assault and nearly
seven of every ten defendants accused of larceny
received probation. When ajail sentence does result
from conviction, it is likely to be for a short period.
Given these conditions, a majority of defendants
may feel that neither a trial nor active negotiation
with the prosecutor is necessary. Consequently, a
defense attorney may best serve his client's interest
by facilitating his plea of guilty.
Rosett and Cressey emphasize plea bargaining
as a method of "settling disputes," a view that is
also consistent with the infrequency of prison sen-
tences for assault and larceny cases.23 From the
case settling perspective, it is reasonable to believe
that "routine" cases have little to be contested,
especially if both sides believe the defendant is
guilty. Solutions to conflicts are sought through
what is believed to be an appropriate settlement.
Since robbery, burglary, assault, and larceny are
high-volume offenses, there is ample opportunity
for "rules of thumb" to arise, especially since senior
assistant United States attorneys supervise plea
negotiations. Because probation frequently follows
conviction at trial, guilty plea dispositions are to
be expected. When more difficult cases appear
there may be less pressure to compromise with a
bargain. Perhaps this explains why robbery, the
offense that routinely results in a prison sentence,
was found to be the only offense in which sentence
concessions are awarded.
Other researchers have pointed out that trials
are disruptive, not only forjudges and prosecutors,
but also for defense counsel. Rarely is a defendant
capable of determining whether he received a bar-
gain. Given the high incidence of probation, the
prosecutor's willingness to award charge reduc-
tions, which do not necessarily lead to sentence
concessions, and the actual award of sentence re-
ductions in robbery cases, it is easy to see how a
plea bargaining "myth" is preserved for nonrob-
bery offenses. From the organizational viewpoint,
2 A. RossErr & D. CREssEY, note 3 supra.
a high volume of guilty pleas preserves organiza-
tional equilibrium at the same time that it appears
to serve the defendant's interests. As a result, the
plea bargaining "myth" promotes the smooth op-
eration of criminal justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the statistical
analysis that forms the basis for findings reported
here captures only routine case handling. It may
be that plea bargaining is more important in atyp-
ical cases and that in those cases sentence conces-
sions do occur. Furthermore, it is reasonable to
expect that these atypical cases are the most highly
publicized and eventually come to characterize
what is believed to be typical in the criminal justice
process. Whatever the explanation, sentencing
concessions in exchange for guilty pleas do not
appear to be pervasive in the District of Columbia
Superior Court.
Turning to reasons given for dismissing criminal
cases, Table 8 shows that reasons for these dispo-
sitions vary considerably across categories. Correct-
ing for the category "unknown," it is possible to
determine why cases were dismissed by the prose-
cutor despite an initial estimate that the defendant
was likely to be factually guilty and stood a good
chance of being convicted.24 First, the large pro-
portions of dismissed cases reported earlier are
misleading. Approximately ten percent of all dis-
missals were part of a plea bargain, primarily in
exchange for a plea to another charge in the same
case. Thus, defendants in this category ultimately
are convicted and sentenced for at least some of-
fense. Similarly, over half of the larceny filings,
almost twenty percent of the burglary filings, and
six percent of the assault filings were assigned
primarily to one of two diversion programs existing
in the District of Columbia. In addition, a signifi-
cant proportion of criminal cases lack prosecutory
merit because of the trivial or insignificant nature
of the offense. As shown in Table 8, thirty-one
percent of the robbery filings, over ten percent of
the assault filings, and almost twenty percent of
the burglary filings lacked merit. When the statis-
tics are corrected to account for plea bargaining,
diversion, and cases that lack prosecutory merit,
the proportion of prosecutorial and judicial dis-
2 Correcting for the category "unknown" involved
dividing the percentages in each row by the number one
minus the proportion unknown. This correction factor
assumes that "unknown" is uniformly distributed
throughout the explanations given. We have no evidence
or reason to believe that the category "unknown" varies
systematically. It varies little across offense categories and
only slightly and irregularly over time.
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TABLE 8
REASONS GIVEN BY THE PROSECUTING ATrORNEY FOR NOLLES AND DISMISSALS, CORRECTED FOR THE CATEGORY
"UNKNOWN" a
Rea.son Given Type of Offense
by Prosecutor Aault Robbery Larceny Burglary
Evidence Problemsb 10% 31% 10% 16%
Witness Problems' 59 27 21 31
Due Process 0 0 1 0
Bookkeeping 6 10 3 10
Lacks Merite 12 31 5 16
Diversion' 6 0 51 16
Guilty Plea" 6 2 17 7
Source: PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management Information System).
Note: Number of cases examined: assault (781), robbery (662), larceny (1154), and burglary (577), excluding cases in
which the reasons for dismissals were not known.
'The reason for lick of prosecution was frequently unknown: assault (32%), robbery (38%), larceny (27%), and
burglary (39%).
b The most frequently cited "evidence problems" were (1) analysis report unavailable, (2) analytical results
insufficient to prove offense, and (3) physical evidence unavailable to prove offense.
'The most frequent explanations of "witness problems" were (1) complaining witness did not appear or was unfit
for trial, (2) unable to locate complaining witness, and (3) police officer failed to appear or was unavailable.
d "Bookkeeping" most frequently refers to (1) charge mooted by verdict of the most serious offense and (2) charge
to be picked up by the grand jury.
' The dominant explanation for "lacks prosecutive merit" was that the offense was trivial or insignificant.
r Diversion was primarily to Project Crossroads or the First Offender Treatment program.
' When "plea bargain" was given as an explanation for dismissals, it generally means that the defendant pled to
another charge in the current case in exchange for a nolle of this charge.
missals attributed to problems With the case, wit-
ness or evidence problems, or due process concerns
falls markedly to sixty-nine percent for assault,
fifty-eight percent for robbery, thirty-two percent
for larceny, and forty-seven percent for burglary.
These final figures provide a better estimate of the
number of defendants who appear likely to be
guilty but who manage to escape the judicial proc-
ess.
However, these numbers may still overstate the
proportion of defendants who "escape" the crimi-
nal justice process. The prosecutor's charging re-
sponsibility is not limited to selecting cases with a
high probability of conviction. He must also con-
sider the appropriateness of the criminal process in
managing conflicts that result in arrests. Assistant
United States attorneys meet this responsibility by
selectively filing criminal cases.25 Kristen Williams
found that cases in which the victim provoked or
participated in the criminal event were more likely
to be dropped at screening, a policy choice that
appears to reflect the defendant's lessened respon-
sibility or the victim's lack of deservedness in such
cases. Additionally, in cases of aggravated assault,
sexual assault, and robbery, victims who were
K. Williams, note 3 supra.
chronic alcohol abusers were more likely to have
their cases rejected at screening. Finally, the social
relationship between the victim and the defendant
frequently made a difference in case processing,
perhaps because witness problems were more likely
to occur, or because the criminal process, was seen
as inappropriate in handling what were essentially
domestic relation conflicts. Thus, in screening
cases, assistant United States attorneys recognize
that criminal prosecution is frequently inappro-
priate in settling disputes. Yet the fact remains that
from thirty-two to sixty-nine percent of all dis-
missed cases result from witness problems and dif-
ficulties with physical evidence, and a majority of
these cases would likely not fall into the category
"inappropriate for criminal prosecution." Since
Table 8 lists reasons given for dismissing cases
following case filings, other explanations must under-
lie these reasons. In his study of witness coopera-
tion, Frank Cannavale concluded:
[C]ommunication difficulties between police/pros-
ecutor and witness prevented prosecutors from as-
certaining the true intentions of many witnesses. As
a result, many witnesses were regarded as noncoop-
eratorg when this was not necessarily their conscious
choice. The impact on prosecutive effectiveness is
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obvious: many cases may have been rejected,
dropped or dismissed when they could and should
have been pursued, had communication problems
not led prosecutors to misinterpret witnesses' inten-
tions.'
In interviews with 215 persons labeled as non-
cooperative by prosecutors, ninety-four percent dis-
agreed with the prosecutor's assessments and as-
serted that they were willing to testify.
27
In part, witness problems seem to arise because
police officers either fail to get the names of wit-
nesses or inaccurately record addresses. But Can-
navale also concluded:
Failing to contact a witness in order to arrange an
appearance at trial, the prosecutor's office leaves a
telephone message, which is never passed on to the
witness. Time constraints do not permit follow-up
by the prosecuting attorney, and there is a scarcity
of qualified support staff to do it. The witness fails
to appear, which, in all likelihood, leaves the pros-
ecutor little choice except to check as the reason for
dropping the case "witness no show."
'ss
These findings linking resource contraints to wit-
ness problems and dismissals are important to an
assessment of plea bargaining, for two reasons.
First, the actual availability of witnesses and phys-
ical evidence is less important to a guilty plea than
it is to a trial; i.e., a prosecutor who negotiates an
out-of-court settlement need not worry whether a
crucial witness will appear for trial. Second, to the
extent that guilty pleas free prosecutorial resources
that otherwise would be devoted to trial prepara-
tion, it is possible to be more thorough in preparing
other cases, including maintaining contact with
witnesses and gathering physical evidence. Refer-
ring to the criminal process model developed ear-
lier, it is our expectation that the larger the number
of guilty pleas, the smaller the number of dis-
missals.
This model of prosecution receives additional
support from the effect of a career criminal pro-
gram, Operation Doorstop, initiated in August
1976 by the Metropolitan Police Department and
the United States Attorney's Office for the District
of Columbia. Prior to 1976, the fact that a defend-
ant was a career criminal did not cause the prose-
cutor to devote special attention to his case, with
the exception of serious crimes with marginal evi-




dence.29 After this experimental program was in-
stituted, experienced prosecutors and police inves-
tigators were specially assigned to the cases of
repeating violent offenders. Selection was made
after case screening and not all eligible cases were
selected.
Four prosecutors are assigned to Operation
Doorstop. One prosecutor is responsible for the case
following screening through indictment; the second
is responsible for trial and sentencing. In addition,
six police officers are available for special investi-
gations.S
°
Because of the selective nature of the program,
it is not possible to conclude definitively that Op-
eration Doorstop had an impact on case processing.
Nevertheless, its apparent impact is consistent with
expectations. Only six percent of the cases of the
selected career criminals (N= 148) were dismissed
compared with thirty-five percent of all other fe-
lonies (N=2,441). Trials were also more likely to
occur in career criminal cases than in others
(twenty-three percent to seventeen percent of all
cases going to trial or entering a guilty plea), and
trials of career criminals were more likely to result
in conviction (eighty-five percent to seventy-three
percent). Finally, cases involving career criminals
required only half the court time that was required
for other felonies (113 days to 235 days).31 Given
that career criminals were not previously given
special prosecutory consideration, these findings
are consistent with a belief that many cases are
dismissed and others are disposed of by guilty
pleas, partly because of resource constraints.32
SUMMARY
As noted earlier, because of the uncertainty of
trial, were it not for the significant number of
guilty pleas, a large number of criminal cases prob-
2 Curbing the Repeat Offender: A Strategy for Prosecutors,
PROMIS Research Publication No. 3 (INSLAW 1977).30 This description comes from K. Williams, Robbery
and Burglary. A Study of the Characteristics of Persons Arrested
and the Handling of Their Cases in Court, PROMIS Research
Publication No. 6 (INSLAW 1979), and K. Brosi, note 5
supra.
.I Brosi, supra note 5, at IX-10, IX- 11. Brosi reports a
similar program impact in Detroit. In New Orleans and
Indianapolis, the dismissal rate is the same for career
criminal and other felony prosecutions, but for career
criminals, the trial rate is greater; and cases that go to
trial more frequently result in convictions.
32 They are also consistent in the selection of cases for
the career criminal program on the basis ofconvictability,
in addition to the formal criteria. (Clearly, some addi-




ably would not result in convictions. Thus, guilty
pleas aid the prosecution by rendering convictions
for those who have committed a crime but who
would not be convicted at trial. As a further benefit
to the prosecutor, and contrary to expectation,
sentence concessions were not awarded routinely to
defendants who entered guilty pleas. In fact, no
concessions were apparent for assault and larceny
cases. For burglary, many guilty pleas followed
charge reductions, but there was no evidence that
these charge reductions resulted in lenient sen-
tences. Only for the offenses of robbery were sen-
tences more severe for offenders convicted at trial.
As the defendant's adversary, the defendant's
losses are the prosecutor's gains. Thus, the prose-
cutor benefits from increased convictions and loses
little from bargaining concessions. Only for rob-
bery do guilty plea defendants appear to receive
more lenient treatment. Since a trial is much more
expensive than a guilty plea, a guilty plea saves the
prosecutor resources. It is likely that Without those
savings his office would be forced to handle a
reduced work load.
In general, guilty pleas benefited the prosecutor,
while only benefiting those defendants who were
charged with robbery.
